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Abstract Assurance cases are often required as a means to certify a crit-
ical system. Use of formal methods in assurance can improve automation,
and overcome problems with ambiguity, faulty reasoning, and inadequate
evidentiary support. However, assurance cases can rarely be fully form-
alised, as the use of formal methods is contingent on models validated
by informal processes. Consequently, we need assurance techniques that
support both formal and informal artifacts, with explicated inferential
links and assumptions that can be checked by evaluation. Our contri-
bution is a mechanical framework for developing assurance cases with
integrated formal methods based in the Isabelle system. We demonstrate
an embedding of the Structured Assurance Case Meta-model (SACM)
using Isabelle/DOF, and show how this can be linked to formal analysis
techniques originating from our verification framework, Isabelle/UTP.
We validate our approach by mechanising a fragment of the Tokeneer
security case, with evidence supplied by formal verification.
1 Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) control critical socio-technical processes prone to
faults and other critical events with potentially undesired consequences. Such
systems include autonomous vehicles, traffic flow control, patient monitoring,
surgical robot assistants, and building security automation. Real-time concurrency
of physical events and computation poses tough challenges in achieving high levels
of assurance in verification and validation. Consequently, the benefits of CPS can
only be harnessed if they acquire consumer trust and regulatory acceptance.
Safety cases [20, 23], and more generally assurance cases, are structured argu-
ments, supported by evidence, intended to convice a regulator that a system is
acceptably safe for application in a specific operating environment [18]. They are
recommended by several international standards, such as ISO26262 for automot-
ive applications. An assurance case consists of a hierarchical decomposition of
requirements, through appropriate argumentation strategies, into further claims,
and eventually supporting evidence. Several languages exist for expressing assur-
ance cases, including the Goal Structuring Notation [23] (GSN), and the closely
related Structured Assurance Case Metamodel1 (SACM).
1 Structured Assurance Case Metamodel: http://www.omg.org/spec/SACM/
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Assurance case creation can be supported by model-based design, which
utilises architectural and behavioural models over which requirements can be
formulated [18]. However, safety cases can suffer from undermining logical fallacies
and lack of evidence [17]. A proposed solution is formalisation in a machine-
checked logic to enable verification of consistency and well-foundedness [26].
As confirmed by avionics standard DO-178C supplement DO-333, the evidence
gathering process can also benefit from the rigour of formal methods. At the same
time, we acknowledge that, (1) assurance cases are intended primarily for human
consumption, and (2) that formal models must be validated informally [19].
Consequently, assurance cases will usually combine informal and formal content,
and any tool must support this.
Our vision is a unified framework for machine-checked assurance cases, and
with evidence provided by a number of integrated formal methods [16]. Such a
framework can have a transformative effect in the field of assurance by harnessing
results from automated formal verification to produce assurance cases undergirded
by specific mathematical guarantees of their consistency and adequacy of the
evidence. Moreover, it can provide a potential route to regulatory acceptance,
through the production of mathematically verified safety certificates.
The contributions of this paper make a first step in this direction: (1) an
implementation of SACM in the Isabelle interactive theorem prover [24], (2)
a machine-checked domain-specific assurance language, and (3) integration of
formal evidence from our verification framework, Isabelle/UTP [14]. Isabelle
provides a sophisticated executable document model for presenting a graph of
hyperlinked artifacts, like definitions, theorems, and proofs. The document model
provides automatic and incremental consistency checking, and change analysis,
where updates to model artifacts trigger rechecking. Such capabilities can support
efficient maintenance and evolution of model-based assurance cases [20].
Moreover, the document model allows management of both informal and
formal content, and access to a vast array of automated verification tools [29]. In
particular, our own verification framework, Isabelle/UTP [14,15], harnesses Hoare
and He’s Unifying Theories of Programming [21] (UTP) to provide verification
facilities for a variety of programming and modelling languages with paradigms
as diverse as concurrency, real-time, and hybrid computation. We validate our
approach by mechanising an assurance case for the Tokeneer system [1], including
the underlying formal model and verification of security functional requirements2.
In §2 we outline preliminary materials: SACM, Isabelle, and the Isabelle/DOF
ontology framework. In §3 we describe the Tokeneer system, and how it is assured
and verified. In §4 we begin our contributions by describing the implementation
of Isabelle/SACM and our assurance DSL in Isabelle. In §5 we describe how
we model and verify Tokeneer using our verification framework, Isabelle/UTP.
In §6 we describe the mechanisation of the assurance case for Tokeneer in
Isabelle/SACM. In §7 we highlight related work, and in §8 we conclude.
2 Supporting materials, including Isabelle theories, can be found on our website
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Figure 2: SACM Argumentation Meta-Model
2 Preliminaries
Figure 1: Goal Structuring Notation
SACM. Assurance cases are of-
ten presented using a notation
like GSN [23] (Figure 1), that
shows the claims that are made,
the argumentation strategies,
the contextual elements, assump-
tions, justifications, and eventu-
ally evidence. SACM is an OMG
standard meta-model for assur-
ance cases [20,28]. It aims at uni-
fying and refining a variety of
predecessor notations, including
GSN [23] and CAE (Claims, Ar-
guments, and Evidence), and is intended to be a definitive reference model.
SACM has three crucial concepts: arguments, artifacts, and terminology. An
argument consists of a collection of claims, evidence citations, and inferential
links between them. Artifacts manifest evidence, such as models, techniques,
results, verification activities, and participants. Terminology is used to fix formal
terms for the use in claims. Normally, claims are textual, but in SACM they can
also contain structured expressions, which allows integration of formal languages.
The argumentation meta-model is shown in Figure 2. The base class is Argu-
mentAsset, which groups the argument assets, such as Claims, ArtifactReferences,
and AssertedRelationships (which are inferential links). Every asset may contain a
MultiLangString that provides a description, potentially in multiple natural and
formal languages, and corresponds to contents of the shapes in Figure 1.
AssertedRelationships represent a relationship that exists between several assets.
They can be of type AssertedContext, which uses an artifact to define context;
AssertedEvidence, which evidences a claim; AssertedInference which describes
4 Yakoub Nemouchi, Simon Foster, Mario Gleirscher, Tim Kelly
explicit reasoning from premises to conclusion(s); or AssertedArtifactSupport
which documents an inferential dependency between the claims of two artifacts.
Both Claims and AssertedRelationships inherit from Assertion, because in SACM
both claims and inferential links are subject to argumentation and refutation.
SACM allows six different classes of assertion, via the attribute assertionDeclar-
ation, including axiomatic (needing no further support), assumed, and defeated,
where a claim is refuted. An AssertedRelationship can also be flagged as isCounter,
where counterevidence for a claim is presented.
Isabelle. Isabelle/HOL is an interactive theorem prover for higher order logic
(HOL) [24], based on the generic framework Isabelle/Isar [30]. The former provides
a functional specification language, and a large array of facilities for proof and
automated verification. The latter has an interactive, extensible, and executable
document model, which describes Isabelle theories. An Isabelle theory contains
a sequence of executable markup commands with a semantics given in the
meta-language SML.
keywords
assumes
and
shows
ML
text
lemma
end
theory
imports
begin
Figure 3: Document Model
Figure 3 gives an overview of the docu-
ment model. The first section for context defin-
ition describes imports of existing theories, and
keywords which give extensions to the concrete
syntax. The second section is the body en-
closed between begin-end which is a sequence
of commands. Isabelle commands have a con-
crete syntax consisting of pre-declared top-
level keywords (in blue), such as the command
ML, followed by a “semantics area” enclosed
between <...>. The keywords can be asso-
ciated with optional attribute keywords (in
green). The processing of the concrete syntax
and any extensions is performed by SML code.
An Isabelle session is as an acyclic graph
grouping several theories and their depend-
encies. When an edit is made to a document
in a session, it is immediately processed and
executed, with feedback provided to the user.
For example, whenever the dependency structure of a document changes due to
the removal, addition, or alteration of artifacts, Isabelle reruns the associated
code and any dependencies. This feature makes Isabelle ideal for assurance cases,
which have to be updated with every increment in system development
In addition to formal content, Isabelle theories can also contain informal
commentary. The text <...> command is a processor for textual markup content
containing a mixture of informal content, and links to formal document entities
through antiquotations of the form @{aqname ...}. Antiquotations trigger a series
of checks, for example the antiquotation @{thm <HOL.refl>} checks if the theorem
HOL.refl exists within the underlying theory context, and if so inserts a hyperlink.
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Plugins, such as Isabelle/HOL, HOL-TestGen [3], and Isabelle/DOF [2] con-
tain document models and conservative extensions, following the LCF approach.
Isabelle/DOF [2] is a plugin that the Isabelle/Isar document model implemented
with support for ontologies. The result is a machine-checked document model
with formal hyperlinks between document instances of the modelled ontology.
The central component of Isabelle/DOF is the Isabelle Ontology Specification
Language (IOSL), which describes the content of documents in terms of several
document classes. Document classes can be linked to form a class model. We
refer to [2] for examples to model document content within Isabelle/DOF. A
document class is the main entity in IOSL and it is represented using the command
doc_class, which creates a new class with a number of typed attributes. The
attributes of doc_class can refer both to the standard HOL types such as string,
bool, and also internal Isabelle meta-types such as thm, term, or typ, which
represent theorems, logical terms, and types, respectively. This is because DOF
ontologies sit a the meta-logical level, and so they can freely mix formal and
informal content. This is our motivation for its use in mechanising SACM.
3 Running Example: Tokeneer
To demonstrate our approach, we use the Tokeneer Identification Station (TIS)3
illustrated in Figure 4, a system that guards entry to a secure enclave by ensuring
that only authorised users are admitted.
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Figure 4: Tokeneer System Overview
The relevant physical infrastruc-
ture consists of a door, a fingerprint
reader, a display, and a card (token)
reader. The main function of the TIS
is to check the stored credentials on
a presented token, read a fingerprint
if necessary, and then either unlatches
the door, or denies entry. Entry is per-
mitted when the token holds at least
three data items: (1) an ID certificate,
which identifies the user, (2) a privilege certificate, which stores a clearance level,
and (3) an identification and authentication (I&A) certificate, which assigns a
fingerprint template. When the user first presents their token the three certificates
are read and cross-checked. If the token is valid, then a fingerprint is taken, which
if validated against the I&A certificate, allows the door to be unlocked once
the token is removed. An optional authorisation certificate is also written upon
successful authentication which allows the fingerprint check to be skipped.
The TIS has a variety of other functions related to its administration. Before
use, a TIS must be enrolled, meaning it is loaded with a public key chain and
certificate, which are needed to check token certificates. Moreover, the TIS
stores audit data which can be used to check previously occurred entries. The
3 Project website: https://www.adacore.com/tokeneer
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TIS therefore also has a keyboard, floppy drive, and screen to configure it.
Administrators are granted access to these functions. The TIS also has an alarm
which will sound if the door is left open for too long.
Our objective is to construct an assurance case that argues that the TIS fulfils
its security properties and complies to the Common Criteria (CC) standard [4].
CC supports a vendor in delivering a system compliant to a security level while
a certification authority confirms compliance and further qualities. The standard
defines seven Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs), each a collection of Security
Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs)
the system would have to meet. Formal Methods (FMs) are strongly recommended
for EAL 5 and above. Now, one can either (a) use a pre-specified set of general
security properties, or (b) develop an application-specific set with the potential of
additional effort due to requirements analysis. The security of the TIS is assured
according to (b) by demonstrating six SFRs [6], of which the first four are shown
here and detailed below in section 5:
SFR1 If the latch is unlocked by TIS, then TIS must be in possession of either a User
Token or an Admin Token. The User Token must either have a valid Authorisation
Certificate, or must have valid ID, Privilege, and I&A Certificates, together with a
template that allowed TIS to successfully validate the user’s fingerprint. Or, if the
User Token does not meet this, the Admin Token must have a valid Authorisation
Certificate, with role of “guard”.
SFR2 If the latch is unlocked automatically by TIS, then the current time must be
close to being within the allowed entry period defined for the User requesting access.
SFR3 An alarm will be raised whenever the door/latch is insecure.
SFR4 No audit data is lost without an audit alarm being raised.
The pioneering work on the assurance of the TIS according to option (b)
was carried out by Praxis High Integrity Systems and SPRE Inc. [1]. Barnes et
al. performed security analysis, specification using Z, implementation in SPARK,
and verification and test of the security properties. After independent assessment
EAL 5 was achieved. This way, Tokeneer became a successful example of the use
of FMs in assuring a system against CC.
4 Isabelle/SACM
In the following we encode SACM in Isabelle/DOF as an ontology, and then use
it to provide a concrete syntax for our assurance case language. Our embedding
implements assurance cases as meta-logical entities. We are not embedding
assurance arguments in the HOL logic, as this would prevent the expression of
informal reasoning and explanation. Rather, SACM is implemented as a datatype
in SML, meaning that we can refer to entities like types, terms, and theorems
as objects. Thus, certain claims can contain formal expressions, but others may
have unstructured natural language. Thus, we faithfully represent the inherently
semi-formal nature of assurance cases.
We focus on the ArgumentationPackage4 from Figure 2, as this is most relevant
for the TIS argument we develop in §6. Different types of evidences and context,
4 We model all parts of argumentation, base, artifact and terminology packages in
Isabelle/DOF, but omit details about these for space reasons.
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modelled by the ArtifactPackage, can support a claim. The class ArgumentAsset
is represented in Isabelle/DOF as follows:
doc class ArgumentAsset = ArgumentationElement +
content_assoc:: MultiLangString
Here, ArgumentationElement is a base class which ArgumentAsset inherits from,
but is not discussed further. The content_assoc:: MultiLangString is an attribute
modelling an association between ArgumentAsset and MultiLangString from the
BasePackage. It allows classes inherited from ArgumentAsset to include content
expressed in multiple languages, and also structured expressions, using the
TerminologyPackage. Our implementation of MultiLangString allows us to embed
a variety of informal and formal content utilising the Isabelle term language.
The class ArgumentAsset is inherited by three classes: (1) Assertion, which
is a unified type for claims and their relationships; (2) ArgumentReasoning,
which is used to explicate the argumentation strategy being employed; and
(3) ArtifactReference, that evidences a claim with an artifact.
In Isabelle/DOF, ArgumentAsset is inherited as follows:
datatype assertionDeclarations_t =
Asserted|Axiomatic|Defeated|Assumed|NeedsSupport
doc class Assertion = ArgumentAsset +
assertionDeclaration::assertionDeclarations_t
doc class ArgumentReasoning = ArgumentAsset +
structure_assoc::"ArgumentPackage option"
doc class ArtifactReference = ArgumentAsset +
referencedArtifactElement_assoc::"ArtifactElement set"
Here, assertionDeclarations_t is an Isabelle/HOL enumeration type, set is the
set type, and option is the optional type. The attribute assertionDeclaration
is of type assertionDeclarations_t, which specifies the status of assertions. The
attribute structure_assoc is an association to the class ArgumentPackage, which
is not discussed here. Finally, the attribute referencedArtifactElement_assoc is
an association to the ArtifactPackage allowing claims to reference artifacts.
The class Claim is a leaf child class and inherits from the class Assertion.
This means that an instance of Claim has a gid, a MultiLangString description,
and can be Axiomatic, Asserted, etc. The other child class for Assertion is:
doc class AssertedRelationship = Assertion +
isCounter::bool
reasoning_assoc:: "ArgumentReasoning option"
Here, isCounter specifies whether the target of the relation is refuted by the
source, and reasoning_assoc is an association to ArgumentReasoning, to elaborate
the strategy. AssertedRelationship models the relationships between elements of
type ArgumentAsset. In addition to the inherited attributes from parent classes, the
relationship classes have the attributes source and target. The source attribute
carries the supporting elements and the target carries the supported elements.
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From the SACM ontology, we create a number of Isabelle commands that
create elements of the meta-model. Our approach gives a concrete syntax for
SACM in terms of Isabelle commands as follows. Instances of concrete leaf child
classes in the metamodel have concrete syntax consisting of an Isabelle top-level
command. Instances of attributes of a leaf child class, including the inherited ones,
have a concrete syntax represented by an Isabelle (green) subcommand. Instances
of associations between leaf child classes have a concrete syntax represented by an
Isabelle subcommand. The command has the name of the represented association
and has an input with the type of the association of the underlying instance. A
selection of the commands for SACM is shown below.
CLAIM <gid> CONTENT <MultiLangString>
ASSERTED INFERENCE <gid> SOURCE <gid>* TARGET <gid>*
ASSERTED CONTEXT <gid> SOURCE <gid>* TARGET <gid>*
ASSERTED EVIDENCE <gid> SOURCE <gid>* TARGET <gid>*
ARTIFACT <gid> VERSION <text> DATE <text> CONTENT <MultiLangString>
CLAIM creates a new claim with an identifier (gid), and content described by a
MultiLangString. ASSERTED_INFERENCE creates an inference between several claims.
Is has subcommands SOURCE and TARGET that are both lists of elements. The
command ensures that the cited claims exist, otherwise an error message is issued.
ASSERTED_CONTEXT similarly asserts that an entity should be treated as context for
another, and ASSERTED_EVIDENCE associates evidence with a claim. The ARTIFACT
command creates an evidential artifact, with description, date, and content.
Figure 5: Relations in Isabelle/SACM
Each command also has an associ-
ated antiquotation, which can be used
to reference the entity type in a claim
string. This is illustrated in Figure 5,
which shows the interactive nature of
the assurance case language. It rep-
resents an inferential link between a
strategy and a justification (cf. Fig-
ure 1). An asserted inference called
Rel_A has been created that attempts
to link existing claims Claim_A and
Claim_B. However, Claim_B does not
exist, and so the error message at the
top of the screenshot is issued. A tex-
tual element is then created which references Rel_A using the antiquotation class
@{AssertedInference ...}. This also leads to an error, shown at the bottom,
since Rel_A does not exist.
We have now developed our interactive assurance case tool. In the next section
we begin to consider assurance of the Tokeener system, first considering formal
verification of the security properties.
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quiescent gotUserToken
ReadUserToken
waitingFinger gotFinger
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Entry
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FingerOK
WriteUser
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Figure 6: TIS Main States
5 Modelling and Verification of Tokeneer
In this section we formally model the TIS in Isabelle/UTP [14], in order to provide
evidence for the assurance case. In [6], the six SFRs are argued semi-formally, but
here we provide a formal proof. We focus on the formalisation and verification of
the user entry part of SFR1, and describe the elements necessary for this.
The TIS behaviour, formalised by Praxis in the Z notation [5], uses an
elaborate state space and a collection of relational operations. The state is
bipartite, consisting of (1) the digital state of the TIS and (2) the variables
shared with the real world, which are monitored or controlled, respectively. The
TIS monitors the time, enclave door, fingerprint reader, token reader, and several
peripherals. It controls the door latch, an alarm, a display, and a screen.
The specification describes a state transition system, illustrated in Figure 6
(cf. [5, page 43]), where each transition corresponds to an operation. Several opera-
tions are ommited due to space constraints. Following enrolment, the TIS becomes
quiescent (awaiting interaction). ReadUserToken triggers if the token is presented,
and reads its contents. Assuming a valid token, the TIS determines whether a
fingerprint is necessary, and then triggers either BioCheckRequired or BioCheckNo-
tRequired. If required, the TIS then reads a fingerprint (ReadFingerOK), validates
it (ValidateFingerOK), and finally writes an authorisation certificate to the token
(WriteUserTokenOK). If the access credentials are available (waitingEntry), then
a final check is performed (EntryOK), and once the user removes their token
(waitingRemoveTokenSuccess), the door is unlocked (UnlockDoor).
We mechanise the TIS model by first creating hierarchical state space types,
with invariants adapted from the Z specification [5]. We define the operations using
Dijkstra’s guarded command language [10] (GCL) rather than the Z schemas
directly, as GCL is easier to reason about and provides similar expressivity.
Moreover, GCL is given a denotational semantics in UTP’s alphabetised relational
calculus [21], and so it is possible to prove equivalence with the corresponding Z
operations. We use a variant of GCL that broadly follows the following syntax:
P ::= skip | abort | P # P | E −→ P | P u P | V := E | V :[P]
Here, P is a program, E is an expression or predicate, and V is a variable.
The language provides the usual syntax for sequential composition, guarded
commands, non-deterministic choice, and assignment. We also adopt a framing
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operator a :[P] which states that P can refer only to variables in the namespace
a, and all other variables remain unchanged [14,15].
We now introduce the TIS state space, on which the state machine will act.
IDStation ,
 currentUserToken : TOKENTRY , currentTime : TIME ,userTokenPresence : PRESENCE , status : STATUS ,
issuerKey : USER 7→ KEYPART, · · ·

Controlled ,
[
latch : LATCH , alarm : ALARM , · · · ]
Monitored ,
[
now : TIME , finger : FINGERPRINTTRY,
userToken : TOKENTRY , · · ·
]
RealWorld , [mon : Monitored, ctrl : Controlled]
SystemState , [rw : RealWorld, tis : IDStation]
We define five state space types that describe the TIS state, the controlled
variables , monitored variables, real-world, and the entire system, respectively.
The controlled variables include the physical latch, the alarm, the display, and the
screen. The monitored variables correspond to time (now), the door (door), the
fingerprint reader (finger), the tokens, and the peripherals. RealWorld combines
the physical variables, and SystemState composes the physical world and TIS.
Variable currentUserToken represents the last token presented to the TIS,
and userTokenPresence indicates whether a token is currently presented. The
variable status is used to record the state the TIS is in, and can take the values
indicated in the state bubbles of Figure 6. Variable issuerKey is a partial function
representing the public key chain, which is needed to authorise user entry.
We now specify a selection of the operations over this state space:
BioCheckRequired ,
(
status = gotUserToken ∧ userTokenPresence = present
∧ UserTokenOK ∧ (¬UserTokenWithOKAuthCert)
)
−→ status := waitingFinger # currentDisplay := insertFinger
ReadFingerOK ,
(
status = waitingFinger ∧ fingerPresence = present
∧ userTokenPresence = present
)
−→ status := gotFinger # currentDisplay := wait
UnlockDoorOK ,
(
status = waitingRemoveTokenSuccess
∧ userTokenPresence = absent
)
−→ UnlockDoor # status := quiescent #currentDisplay := doorUnlocked
Each operation is guarded by execution conditions and consists of several as-
signments. BioCheckRequired requires that the current state is gotUserToken, the
user token is present, and sufficient for entry (UserTokenOK ), but there is no au-
thorisation certificate (¬UserTokenWithOKAuthCert). The latter two predicates
essentially require that (1) the three certificates can be verified against the public
key store, and (2) additionally there is a valid authorisation certificate present.
Their definitions can be found elsewhere [5]. BioCheckRequired updates the state
Assurance Cases in Isabelle 11
to waitingFinger and the display with an instruction to provide a fingerprint.
UnlockDoorOK requires that the current state is waitingRemoveTokenSuccess,
and the token has been removed. It unlocks the door, using the elided operation
UnlockDoor, returns the status to quiescent, and updates the display.
These operations act only on the TIS state space. During their execution
monitored variables can also change, to reflect real-world updates. Mostly these
changes are arbitrary, with the exception that time must increase monotonically.
We therefore promote the operations to SystemState with the following schema.
UEC (Op) , tis :[Op] # rw :[mon:now ≤ mon:now′ ∧ ctrl ′ = ctrl]
In Z, this functionality is provided by schema UserEntryContext [5], from which
we derive the name UEC. It promotes Op to act on tis, and composes this with a
relation that specifies changes to the real-world variables (rw). We specify this as
a UTP relational predicate. The behaviour of all monitored variables other than
now is arbitrary, and all controlled variables are unchanged. Then, we promote
each operation, for example TISReadTokenOK , UEC (ReadTokenOK ). The
overall behaviour of the entry operations is given below:
TISUserEntryOp ,
TISReadUserToken u TISValidateUserTokenu TISReadFinger u TISValidateFinger
u TISUnlockDoor u TISCompleteFailedAccess u · · ·

In each iteration of the state machine, we non-deterministically select an enabled
operation and execute it. We also update the controlled variables, which is done
by composition with the following update operation.
TISUpdate , rw :[mon:now ≤ mon:now′] # rw:ctrl:latch := tis:currentLatch #
rw:ctrl:display := tis:currentDisplay
We also formalise the TIS state invariants necessary to prove SFR1:
Inv1 ,
status ∈
{
gotFinger,waitingFinger,waitingUpdateToken
waitingEntry,waitingUpdateTokenSuccess
}
⇒ (UserTokenWithOKAuthCert ∨ UserTokenOK )
Inv2 ,
status ∈ {waitingEntry,waitingUpdateTokenSuccess}
⇒ (UserTokenWithOKAuthCert ∨ FingerOK )
TIS-inv , Inv1 ∧ Inv2 ∧ · · ·
Inv1 states that whenever the TIS is in a state beyond gotUserToken, then either
a valid authorisation certificate is present, or else the user token is valid. Inv2
states that whenever in state waitingEntry or waitingUpdateTokenSuccess, then
either an authorisation certificate or a valid finger print is present. We elide the
additional invariants that deal with the alarm and audit data [5].
Next, we show that each operation preserves TIS-inv using Hoare logic.
Theorem 5.1. {TIS-inv}TISUserEntryOp {TIS-inv}
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Proof. Automatic, by application of Isabelle/UTP proof tactic hoare-auto.
This theorem shows that the state machine never violates the invariants, and we
can assume they hold to satisfy any requirements. We use this to formalise and
prove SFR1, which requires that we determine all states under which the latch
will be unlocked. We can determine these states by application of the weakest
precondition calculus [10]. Specifically, we characterise the weakest precondition
under which execution of TISUserEntryOp followed by TISUpdate leads to a
state satisfying rw:ctrl:latch = unlocked. We formalise this in the theorem below.
Theorem 5.2 (FSFR1 is satisfied).(
TIS-inv ∧ tis:currentLatch = locked
∧ (TISEntryOp # TISUpdate) wp (rw:ctrl:latch = unlocked)
)
⇒ ((UserTokenOK ∧ FingerOK) ∨ UserTokenWithOKAuthCert)
Proof. Automatic, by application of weakest precondition and relational calculi.
We calculate the weakest precondition, and conjoin this with TIS-Inv, which
always holds, and the predicate tis:currentLatch = locked to capture behaviours
when the latch was initially locked. We show that this composite precondition
implies that either a valid user token and fingerprint were present, or else a valid
authorisation certificate. We have therefore now verified a formalisation of SFR1.
In the next section we place this in the context of an assurance argument.
6 Mechanising the Tokeener Assurance Case
Figure 7: TIS Claim Formalization
In the following, we mechanize
an assurance argument with the
claim that TIS satisfies SFR1.
The assurance case fragment is
shown in Figure 7, which is in-
spired by the formalisation pat-
tern [9]. The latter shows how res-
ults from a formal method can
be employed in an assurance case.
This is contingent on the valid-
ation of both the formal model
and the formal requirement. Con-
sequently, the formalisation pat-
tern breaks down a requirement
into 3 claims stating that (1) the
formal model is validated, (2) the
formal requirement correctly char-
acterises the informal requirement,
and (3) the formal requirement is satisfied by the formal model. The former two
claims will usually have an informal process argument.
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Figure 8: TIS argument: Claims and their relations in Isabelle/SACM
The argument in Figure 7 justifies the link between the informal claim “TIS
satisfies SFR1”, which is in natural language, and the formal theorem FSRF1
from §5, which is expressed in HOL. The top-level claim, TIS-SFR1-C1, states
that SFR1 is satisfied, which it references as a contextual element. This claim
is decomposed by the use of the formalization strategy, TIS-SFR1-S1, which
has the formal property (FSRF1) and TIS model from §5 as context. The
satisfaction of the formal claim is expressed by TIS-SFR1-C4, and evidenced by
SFR1-PROOF, which is the formal proof. The validation claims are encoded
as justifications TIS-SFR1-C3 and TIS-SFR1-C4, which are not elaborated.
Figure 8 contains a mechanised version of the same argument in Isabelle/SACM.
The structure is slightly different from the GSN diagram since justifications are
particular kind of claims in SACM. The five claims are specified using the CLAIM
command, with a name and content associated. The text in these claims integrate
hyper-linked semi-formal and formal content; for example TIS-SFR1-C1 uses
the antiquotation Expression to insert a formal link to the defined expression
for SFR1. Similarly, TIS-SFR1-C3 contains a reference to the resource artifact
TIS, which is a reference to the Tokeneer specification, and also an Isabelle
constant TIS-model which contains the formal TIS model.
The inferences between these claims are specified by several instances of
the ASSERTED_INFERENCE command, each of which links several premise claims to
one or more conclusions. TIS-SFR-S1 shows that satisfaction of the informal
requirement depends on the formal requirement, and the two validation claims.
Figure 7 does not elaborate further on the evidential artifacts required, for
the verification, as GSN does not support this. This is functionality which SACM
supports through the artifact meta-model, which allows us to record activities,
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Figure 9: TIS argument: Artifacts and their relations in Isabelle/SACM
participants, resources, and other assurance artifacts. Figure 9 supplements the
argument in Figure 8 with the various evidential artifacts, and the relationships
between them. For example, the evidence supporting the claim TIS_SFR1_C4
is a reference to the artifact TIS_FSFR1_SPEC_THY which is the Isabelle theory
containing the proof of the theorem stated by TIS_SFR1_C4. TIS_FSFR1_SPEC_THY
refers via the artifact relationship TIS_SFR1_PROOF_ACTIVITY_REL to the context
of the proof which is the artifact Isabelle_IT and to the author of the proof
which is Simon_Foster. This illustrates how Isabelle/SACM allows us to combine
informal artifacts and activities with the formal results they produce.
7 Related Work
Woodcock et al. [31] highlight defects of the Tokeneer SPARK implementation,
indicate undischarged verification conditions, and perform robustness tests gen-
erated by the Alloy SAT solver [22] model. Using De Bono’s lateral thinking,
these test cases go beyond the anticipated operational envelope and stimulate
anomalous behaviours of the Tokeneer implementation. In shortening the feedback
cycle for verification and test engineers, interactive theorem proving can help
using Woodcock’s approach more intensively.
Rivera et al. [25] present an Event-B model of the TIS (the enrolment opera-
tions of the admin are presented), verify this model, generate Java code from it
using the Rodin tool, and test this code by JUnit tests manually derived from the
specification. The tests validate the model in addition to the Event-B invariants
derived from the same specification. The tests aim to detect errors in Event-B
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model caused by misunderstandings of the specification. Using Rodin, the authors
verify the security properties (Section 3) using Hoare triples.
We believe that our work is the first to put formal verification effort into the
wider context of structured assurance argumentation, in our case, a machine-
checked security case using Isabelle/SACM.
Several works bring formality to assurance cases [7–9, 11, 27]. AdvoCATE
is a tool for the construction of GSN-based safety cases [8, 9]. It uses a formal
foundation called argument structures, which prescribe well-formedness checks
for the graph structure, and allow instantiation of assurance case patterns. Our
work likewise ensures well-formedness, and additionally allows the embedding of
formal content. Denney’s formalisation pattern [9] is an inspiration for our work.
Rushby shows how assurance arguments can be embedded into formal logic
to overcome logical fallacies [27]. Our framework similarly allows reasoning using
formal logic, but additionally allows us to combine formal and informal artifacts.
We were also inspired by the work on evidential toolbus [7], which allows the
combination of evidence from several formal and semi-formal analysis tools.
Isabelle similarly allows integration of a variety of formal analysis tools [29].
8 Conclusion
We have presented Isabelle/SACM, a framework for mechanised assurance cases.
We showed how SACM is embedded into Isabelle as an ontology, and provided
an interactive assurance language that generates valid instances. We applied it
to the production of part of the Tokeneer security case, including verification of
one of the security functional requirements, and embedded these results into a
mechanised assurance argument. Of a particular note, Isabelle/SACM enforce the
usage of the formal ontological links which represent the relationships between
the assurance arguments and their claims, a feature we inherit from Isabelle/DOF.
Isabelle/SACM also combines features from Isabelle/HOL, Isabelle/DOF and
SACM which results in a framework that allows the integration of formal methods
and argument-based safety assurance cases.
In future work, we will consider the integration of assurance case pattern
execution [9] into our framework, which facilitate their production. We will also
complete the mechanisation of the TIS security case, including verification of
the other five SFRs. In parallel with this, we are developing our verification
framework, Isabelle/UTP [14] to support a variety of notations used in soft-
ware engineering. We recently demonstrated formal verification facilities for a
statechart-like notation [12], and are also working towards tools to support hybrid
dynamical languages [13] like Modelica and Simulink. Our overarching goal is a
comprehensive assurance framework supported by a variety of integrated formal
methods in order to approach complex certification tasks for cyber-physical
systems and autonomous robots.
16 Yakoub Nemouchi, Simon Foster, Mario Gleirscher, Tim Kelly
References
1. Barnes, J., Chapman, R., Johnson, R., Widmaier, J., Cooper, D., Everett, B.:
Engineering the tokeneer enclave protection software. In: Proceedings of IEEE
International Symposium on Secure Software Engineering (2006), https://www.
adacore.com/uploads/technical-papers/issse2006tokeneer_altran.pdf
2. Brucker, A.D., A¨ıt-Sadoune, I., Crisafulli, P., Wolff, B.: Using the isabelle ontology
framework - linking the formal with the informal. In: CICM. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, vol. 11006, pp. 23–38. Springer (2018)
3. Brucker, A.D., Wolff, B.: On theorem prover-based testing. Formal Asp. Comput.
25(5), 683–721 (2013), https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-012-0222-y
4. Common Criteria Consortium: Common criteria for information technology security
evaluation – part 1: Introduction and general model. Tech. Rep. CCMB-2017-04-001,
Common Criteria Consortium (2017), https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/
index.cfm
5. Cooper, D., et al.: Tokeneer ID Station: Formal Specification. Tech. rep., Praxis
High Integrity Systems (August 2008), https://www.adacore.com/tokeneer
6. Cooper, D., et al.: Tokeneer ID Station: Security Properties. Tech. rep., Praxis
High Integrity Systems (August 2008), https://www.adacore.com/tokeneer
7. Cruanes, S., Hamon, G., Owre, S., Shankar, N.: Tool integration with the evidential
tool bus. In: VMCAI. LNCS, vol. 7737. Springer (2013)
8. Denney, E., Pai, G.: A formal basis for safety case patterns. In: SAFECOMP. LNCS,
vol. 8153. Springer (2013)
9. Denney, E., Pai, G.: Tool support for assurance case development. Automated
Software Engineering 25, 435–499 (2018)
10. Dijkstra, E.W.: Guarded commands, nondeterminacy and formal derivation of
programs. Communications of the ACM 18(8), 453–457 (1975)
11. Diskin, Z., Maibaum, T., Wassyng, A., Wynn-Williams, S., Lawford, M.: Assurance
via model transformations and their hierarchical refinement. In: MODELS. IEEE
(2018)
12. Foster, S., Baxter, J., Cavalcanti, A., Miyazawa, A., Woodcock, J.: Automating
verification of state machines with reactive designs and Isabelle/UTP. In: Proc.
15th. Intl. Conf. on Formal Aspects of Component Software. LNCS, vol. 11222.
Springer (October 2018)
13. Foster, S., Thiele, B., Cavalcanti, A., Woodcock, J.: Towards a UTP semantics for
Modelica. In: UTP. pp. 44–64. LNCS 10134, Springer (2016)
14. Foster, S., Zeyda, F., Nemouchi, Y., Ribeiro, P., Wolff, B.: Isabelle/UTP: Mechanised
Theory Engineering for Unifying Theories of Programming. Archive of Formal Proofs
(2019), https://www.isa-afp.org/entries/UTP.html
15. Foster, S., Zeyda, F., Woodcock, J.: Unifying heterogeneous state-spaces with lenses.
In: ICTAC. LNCS 9965, Springer (2016)
16. Gleirscher, M., Foster, S., Woodcock, J.: New opportunities for integrated formal
methods. Unpublished working paper, Department of Computer Science, University
of York (2018), https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.10103
17. Greenwell, W., Knight, J., Holloway, C.M., Pease, J.: A taxonomy of fallacies in
system safety arguments. In: Proc. 24th Intl. System Safety Conference (July 2006)
18. Habli, I., Ibarra, I., Rivett, R., Kelly, T.: Model-based assurance for justifying
automotive functional safety. In: Proc. SAE World Congress (April 2010)
19. Habli, I., Kelly, T.: Balancing the formal and informal in safety case arguments. In:
VeriSure: Verification and Assurance Workshop, colocated with Computer-Aided
Verification (CAV) (July 2014)
Assurance Cases in Isabelle 17
20. Hawkins, R., Habli, I., Kolovos, D., Paige, R., Kelly, T.: Weaving and assurance
case from design: A model-based approach. In: Proc. 16th Intl. Symp. on High
Assurance Systems Engineering. IEEE (2015)
21. Hoare, C.A.R., He, J.: Unifying Theories of Programming. Prentice-Hall (1998)
22. Jackson, D.: Alloy: A lightweight object modelling notation. ACM Transactions on
Software Engineering and Methodology 11(2), 256–290 (July 2000)
23. Kelly, T.: Arguing Safety – A Systematic Approach to Safety Case Management.
Ph.D. thesis, University of York (1998)
24. Nipkow, T., Paulson, L.C., Wenzel, M.: Isabelle/HOL — A Proof Assistant for
Higher-Order Logic, LNCS, vol. 2283. Springer (2002)
25. Rivera, V., Bhattacharya, S., Catan˜o, N.: Undertaking the tokeneer challenge in
Event-B. In: Proceedings of the 4th FME Workshop on Formal Methods in Software
Engineering - FormaliSE '16. ACM Press (2016)
26. Rushby, J.: Logic and epistemology in safety cases. In: SAFECOMP. vol. LNCS
8153. Springer (2013)
27. Rushby, J.: Mechanized support for assurance case argumentation. In: New Frontiers
in Artificial Intelligence. LNCS, vol. 8417. Springer (2014)
28. Selviandro, N., Kelly, T., Hawkins, R.: The visual inheritance structure to sup-
port the design of visual notations. In: MODELS Workshop. CEUR Workshop
Proceedings, vol. 2245 (October 2018)
29. Wenzel, M., Wolff, B.: Building formal method tools in the isabelle/isar framework.
In: TPHOLs. LNCS, vol. 4732. Springer (2007)
30. Wenzel, M.M., Mu¨nchen, T.U.: Isabelle/isar - a versatile environment for human-
readable formal proof documents (2002)
31. Woodcock, J., Aydal, E.G., Chapman, R.: The tokeneer experiments. In: Reflections
on the Work of C.A.R. Hoare, pp. 405–430. Springer London (2010)
